ANKARA
Following the Libyan revolution’s success in ousting longtime ruler Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya came under two de facto governments.
The first, the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), put together by the UN in 2016, is headed by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and operates in the capital Tripoli in the country's northwest.
The second is a parallel government in the oil-rich east and parts of southern Libya controlled by military commander Khalifa Haftar, who is backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
From a strong supporter of Gaddafi to a defector, the 75-year-old Haftar has switched loyalties in the course of a military career spanning over half a century.
Born in 1943 in the eastern Libyan town of Ajdabiya, Haftar was one of a group of officers led by Col. Muammar Gaddafi which seized power from Libyan King Idris al-Senussi in 1969.
Gaddafi appointed him to be in charge of the Libyan forces that were involved in a bloody conflict with Chad in the 1980s. As Libya was defeated by France-backed Chadian forces. Haftar and 300 of his men were also captured by the Chadians in 1987.
This incident marked the final chapter of his relations with Gaddafi, who disowned him. He was released later from Chad with support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
After Haftar went into exile in the U.S., he formed the military wing of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), an opposition group aimed at overthrowing Gaddafi that was reportedly backed by the CIA.
Return to Libya
Haftar returned to Libya in 2011 after Gaddafi's death and became a key commander of the makeshift rebel force in the east.
In a televised statement in February 2014, he called on Libyans to overthrow the elected parliament and the General National Congress (GNC), accusing the GNC of failing to fight what he called "terrorism." Haftar launched a military offensive against militant groups and managed to secure control of Benghazi in eastern Libya.
Fighting "extremism" while using extremists
Haftar on several occasions announced that his attacks were aimed at ridding Libya of extremist groups such as the Libyan branch of Daesh/ISIS. Yet several media reports accused him of having extremist elements within his military coalition.
In 2019, Haftar promoted Army Major Mahmoud al-Werfalli to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Al-Werfalli was wanted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued an arrest warrant against him in 2017 amid allegations that he had committed war crimes in Libya.
Last year, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) demanded al-Werfalli’s immediate extradition.
In November 2017, Human Rights Watch revealed that armed groups loyal to Haftar may have executed as many as 36 men in the town of al-Abyar, about 30 miles east of Benghazi.
The UN-recognized GNA accused forces loyal to Haftar of committing war crimes during his ongoing offensive against the capital Tripoli and other parts of Libya.
Many observers also accused Haftar of taking advantage of the international rhetoric surrounding the fight against terrorism to gain support from leaders in Paris, Rome, Moscow, Cairo, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Offensive against GNA
Since managing to secure full control over Benghazi in 2017, Haftar has steadily pressed on to expand the territories under his control.
On April 4, 2019, Haftar launched a major military offensive on the capital Tripoli, seeking to unseat the UN-recognized government there.
Media reports said Haftar probably got the green light from his foreign backers. It is no secret that Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia and increasingly Russia and France have been providing his forces, self-proclaimed as the Libyan National Army (LNA), with military and political support.
Just prior to his offensive, he travelled in late March to Riyadh, where he met Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the visit also coincided with a visit Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan paid to Egypt, where he met with President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
Banditry and piracy
In June, six Turkish citizens were abducted by forces loyal to Haftar. They were released following a warning to Haftar by the Turkish Foreign Ministry calling the move an act of banditry and piracy.
In July, the GNA accused militias loyal to Haftar of kidnapping Libyan lawmaker Seham Sergiwa, who was rounded up from her home in Benghazi by masked gunmen. Sergiwa's abduction came a day after her appearance on a television program in which she criticized the Haftar's offensive on Tripoli.
Amnesty International said forces associated with Haftar’s LNA targeted journalists and other activists after they criticized Haftar and his LNA forces. It also said Haftar’s forces abducted people and imprisoned them without charge or trial. The abducted included political activists, lawyers and human rights activists.
Ambition for military dictatorship
Haftar’s LNA currently controls more than two-thirds of the country. It has consolidated power in eastern Libya before launching an offensive against the capital.
Many analysts opine that Haftar has ambitions to rule the whole Libya.
In an interview with the Libyan Observer, Haftar’s former military adviser Mohamed Buisier stated that Haftar was seeking increase his power by any means necessary. A former U.S. official, according to British daily The Guardian, said that Haftar’s real ambition is to turn Libya into a military dictatorship.
Even though Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called for negotiations in October 2018 between Haftar and the GNA, it was clear that he favored Haftar. With whom he had become a close ally since January 2014, when Haftar rejected to extend the mandate of the Libya's General National Congress (GNC), which was dominated by Muslim Brotherhood members.
In backing Haftar, al-Sisi further hopes to demonstrate that the model of military rule can provide security and stability to the country.
In doing the same, Haftar has portrayed himself as the only man who can bring stability to Libya and crush the militants in the North African nation, a form of rhetoric he believes he can rely on in gaining international support or at least convincing the international community not to question his offensive against the GNA.
