By Selim Celal
ISTANBUL
The Iranian judiciary has always been criticized for being overly political. The institution has mass executions, victimization, torture, and the extra-judicial killing of political opponents in its record. But it has remained unchallenged given its constitutional status that places it directly under the control of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
However, this criticism is gradually taking on a new dimension for the past couple of months. Unlike before, this time criticism is leveled by a former president: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who served between 2005 and 2013.
One may recall his speeches about global justice at international fora, including the United Nations General Assembly, throughout his tenure. Those speeches sounded as if the Islamic Republic had successfully accomplished the task of ensuring internal justice and now it was trying to share its experience with the global community under the jargon of “Mahdavite Global Just Society”. But those days are long gone, and at this time Ahmadinejad is the loudest voice against the Iranian judiciary.
As a matter of fact, Ahmadinejad stood against the judiciary during his second term in office. However, at that time it was generally believed that due to his position as president, the judiciary would tolerate him but would definitely go after him as soon as his term was finished, at least banning him from public appearance as it did with his predecessors Muhammad Khatami and the late Hashimi Rafsanjani. It was also thought that once he finished his term, Ahmadinejad would begin to watch his language too.
So far, both of the above predictions have proved to be wrong. Although the judiciary has taken steps against a number of Ahmadinejad’s cronies, it has not directly touched him. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad has turned much more confrontational, supported by a team now defying the entire judiciary.
The course of events took a different turn on Nov. 15 when three key Ahmadinejad allies -- Hamid Baqaee, Akbar Jawanfekr, and Habibullah Khurasani -- instead of reporting to the court upon the summons, took refuge at the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim, a practice popularly known as “bast neshini” (lit. "sanctuary sitting"). A few hours later they were joined by Ahmadinejad and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, one of his first vice presidents when he was in office.
Bast neshini is a symbolic act of protest by someone who feels desperate. In the Shi’a socio-political culture, those who take refuge in the shrine of any Shi’a imam or one of his descendants are considered to be under the protection of that personage. Therefore, traditionally, anyone fearing for his or her life because of the rulers of the time would take refuge in shrines.
In the contemporary history of Iran, the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim is particularly famous for bast neshini due to its adjacency to the capital of the country, as it would easily come to the attention of Persian rulers. Even Persian kings were generally respectful to this practice of taking refuge in shrines.
While, in principle, bast neshini is practiced for individual security, in the modern history of Iran some high-profile figures have resorted to this method for broader political objectives. For instance, the famous Muslim reformist Jamaluddin Afghani sat at the Shah Abdul Azim shrine for over seven months, from where he would deliver his anti-despotism speeches.
In most cases, the Persian rulers would accommodate the political demands of the protestors as a sign of respect to the shrine. In fact, the Iranian constitutional revolution owes much to this practice. As noted by Homa Katouzian, a political scientist and literary critic, Iranian King Nasereddin Shah (1831-1896) appealed to Ayatollah Mullah Ali Kani, a renowned Shi’a cleric, to issue a decree to ban bast neshini, but the clerk replied: “If Your Excellency opens the door of justice, the other door will be [automatically] closed”.
After the 1979 revolution, bast neshini became obsolete. Perhaps, one can argue that the bast neshini of Ahmadinejad’s cronies is the first and most important practice of bast neshini in the history of the Islamic Republic. Before they began their protest, the protesters wrote a letter, arguing that they were tired of victimization and oppression by the judiciary and thus decided to take refuge in the shrine as their only option.
Interestingly, the modern Iranian judiciary was established in 1905 on the order of Mozaffareddin Shah (1853-1907) in response to the demand of some top Shi’a clerics who had sat at Shah Abdul Azim’s shrine for one month; and, now a century later, again a group of people took refuge in the same place against that judiciary.
It is also necessary to note that Shah Abdul Azim is believed to be just a descendent of one of the 12 Shi’a imams, whereas Imam Mahdi, the twelfth Shi’a imam, is believed to have gone into occultation and will come back. During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, he would imply that he was in direct contact with imam Mahdi. At official dinners, he used to place an extra empty plate beside him, connoting that Imam Mahdi was also present and eating beside him. The irony is that this time instead of appealing to a living imam (Mahdi), Ahmadinejad and his team had chosen to seek help from a lesser known and deceased descendent of a Shi’a imam (Shah Abdul Azim).
While historically, those who sought refuge in such shrines were not harmed, the current Iranian rulers are determined not to allow the reemergence of this practice. In line with this, on Nov. 18, Iranian law enforcement officers, popularly known as “plain clothes” (libas shakhsi) attacked Ahmadinejad’s cronies and kicked them out of the shrine. The video footage shows both sides using harsh language against each other inside the shrine.
That said, we should now ask several questions: what are Ahmedinejad’s objectives? Why did Ahmadinejad resort to bast neshini? And why is his overall anti-judiciary campaign not gaining public support? The answers to these questions are hidden in the personal character of Ahmadinejad as well as his political behavior.
Ahmadinejad seems to have access to some important secret files, and has been blackmailing Iranian ruling elites that he would leak those documents. It is difficult to determine the contents of the documents, but one can emphatically say they are not about state secrets, but rather about the misuse of power by top Iranian officials.
However, Ahmadinejad’s threat is not really public interest-oriented. He is using the documents as a bargaining chip to reach a deal with the establishment. It is necessary to note that the settlement which Ahmadinejad is seeking is beyond a simple immunity. To Ahmadinejad, any settlement should include a permission allowing him to stay in politics. And of course, by staying in politics he will be more than a ceremonial figure with a marginal role and with memberships in the Expediency Council, National Security Council etc. Ahmadinejad was very hopeful about securing a deal and getting back to the executive through the presidential election held earlier this year, but he was disqualified. And now he has his eyes on the parliamentary election, which will be held in less than two years. It seems that there is resistance to this demand as well. The escalation of the crisis indicates that Ahmadinejad is frustrated, and so he is trying to increase the pressure on the establishment.
But he does not want to spoil his chances by leaking those secret files, because secrets are valuable as long as one can use them, and their value drops sharply once they are leaked.
In the meantime, Ahmadinejad does not believe in democratic means, such as public protests or strikes. That is why he decided to stand apart from the masses and beat the theocratic system through theocratic rules, by resorting to bast neshini. However, he miscalculated an important detail: he forgot that the practice of bast neshini had been devised by the Shia clergy to pressurize their rulers; but, now the clergy themselves are the rulers, and as such, they are the "masters of the game" that Ahmadinejad and his allies wanted to participate in. Ahmadinejad also forgot Khomeini’s religious decree: “Saving the [theocratic political] system stands atop other religious duties” (Hifz nizam awjab e wajebat ast). It means that the establishment, by virtue of this decree, is permitted to violate the sanctity of a shrine for the supreme cause of saving the theocratic system.
When his bast neshini move failed, Ahmadinejad and his team started releasing a series of revelatory videos and open letters against the judiciary and its head Ayatollah Larijani. A much lighter version of such criticism by any other politician, such as Muhammad Khatami, Mir Hussain Mosavi, or Mehdi Karrobi, could have precipitated a huge public mobilization and even uprisings. But Ahmadinejad has failed to gain the public support he was seeking. This failure, however, does not mean that the corruption in the judiciary is the not a public concern. Quite to the contrary, one can argue that whatever Ahmadinejad is saying about corruption in the judiciary is of public concern and shared by the majority of Iranian citizens, but the problem simply is that they do not believe in Ahmadinejad. Looking at Ahmadinejad’s speeches and letters, one can spot elements of truth with relative ease, but it is impossible to find sincerity. To be specific, ‘absolutely right words’ are expressed through a ‘wrong mouth’.
[ The Turkey-based writer is an expert on Iran’s foreign policy and domestic politics ]
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.
