- Future US support for Taiwan will undoubtedly depend on its China policy. But on this issue, the ‘America First’ agenda has a distinctly hawkish attitude, making it seem unlikely that Trump would just cede a major victory to Beijing by abandoning Taiwan
The author is a senior researcher at Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF).
ISTANBUL
The opening months of US President Donald Trump's second presidency have sent shockwaves through the system of US alliances. Within weeks, the new administration suddenly reversed its support for Ukraine, threatened an end to its NATO commitments, and launched trade wars against its closest allies. Although the disruption has primarily unfolded in Europe, Trump's actions are being monitored just as closely across the Asia-Pacific. This region is the primary arena in which the intensifying great power rivalry between China and the US is playing out, marked by multiple hot spots that could bring both sides into direct military conflict with each other.
Taiwan stands out as the most significant flashpoint – an advanced, democratic island that remains largely unrecognized as a sovereign state. Home to over 20 million people, an advanced economy and the leading global semiconductor manufacturer, Taiwan is claimed in its entirety by the larger Chinese state on the mainland. This situation dates back to the conclusion of the Chinese civil war in 1949, which ended with a Communist victory on the mainland and the retreat of the defeated Kuomintang forces to Taiwan, where their version of a Chinese state – the Republic of China – continues to exist as an independent entity. Over decades of separation, Taiwan has developed a vibrant democratic system, but steadily lost official diplomatic ties with other nations. This includes the US, which switched official recognition to Beijing in 1979, but has continued to maintain robust economic ties and defense cooperation with Taiwan.
However, Taiwan has struggled to keep pace with China's rapid military expansion, and its increasingly aggressive stance. Since August 2022, Chinese military forces have conducted ongoing exercises surrounding Taiwan, with constant incursions [1] into Taiwan's air defense zone. In this situation, the possibility of US intervention serves as an important deterrent against a possible Chinese attempt at military reunification. Under previous US President Joe Biden, this was backed up by repeated, public commitments [2] to defend Taiwan against Chinese attacks. Since there are no formal treaties between the US and Taiwan, presidential statements remain the strongest signal of commitment – but also the most fragile, subject to change with each administration. And initial signals from the new Trump administration have not been positive, rating Taiwan [3] as "not an existential US interest" and demanding that its government should spend 10% of GDP on defense.
Linking up with America First
Despite this, observers in Taiwan have not been rattled by Trump's reelection. In its most recent security survey, [4] a local think tank found that 47% of respondents expected no change in Taiwan-US relations under Trump, with only 24% expecting a downturn (and 12% an improvement). Belief that the US would aid Taiwan in a cross-strait conflict remained at 49%, practically unchanged from earlier editions. There are multiple reasons for this relative calmness:
First, Taiwan has options to link up with Trump's "America First" agenda. It is already a major customer for US weapons exports, and its semiconductor powerhouse TSMC has promised further investments [5] in US facilities. There is also a broad expectation that US-China relations are likely to remain tense; that this situation will move US strategic elites to recognize the value of a sovereign Taiwan, despite ongoing debates; [6] and that there is robust bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress.
Second, Taiwan is already in the process of upgrading its own defense capabilities, with a 2025 draft budget [7] allocating about 2.5% of GDP and a target of 3%. This expansion has robust popular support, [8] although it remains contentious between Taiwan’s executive and opposition-controlled parliament. And it comes on top of other initiatives [9] to strengthen resilience against Chinese “gray zone” and influence operations.
Third, Taiwan has in recent years benefited from more international attention to its situation. The EU, Japan, [10] South Korea [11] and ASEAN [12] have publicly stated their concern about maintaining a peaceful status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While they are not military actors who could replace the US as a balancer, they are economic heavyweights and can provide deterrence through a sanctions threat.
Future US support for Taiwan will undoubtedly depend on its China policy, which has not yet been settled. But on this issue, the "America First" agenda has a distinctly hawkish attitude, making it seem unlikely that Trump would just cede a major victory to Beijing by abandoning Taiwan. While there is a danger that the island could be sold out as part of a “grand bargain” between the great powers, akin to what appears to be happening to Ukraine, Taiwan has its own agency and is doing what it can to prevent such an outcome. Its approach can also serve as inspiration for other US allies fearing abandonment: building up independent capacities and diversifying partnerships are good guidelines in an increasingly uncertain world.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/08/the-maps-that-show-how-chinas-military-is-squeezing-taiwan
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-says-us-forces-would-defend-taiwan-event-chinese-invasion-2022-09-18/
[3] https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Trump-administration/Taiwan-should-spend-10-of-GDP-on-defense-Pentagon-No.-3-pick-Colby-says
[4] https://indsr.org.tw/en/focus?typeid=42&uid=7&pid=2768
[5] https://www.reuters.com/technology/tsmc-ceo-meet-with-trump-tout-investment-plans-2025-03-03/
[6] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/taiwan-fixation-kavanagh-wertheim
[7] https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202503120011
[8] https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/08/parsing-taiwanese-public-opinion-defense-budget/
[9] https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6919#:~:text=In%20remarks%2C%20President%20Lai%20introduced,at%20obscuring%20the%20national%20identity
[10] https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-and-EU-name-Taiwan-in-joint-statement-for-first-time
[11] https://ipdefenseforum.com/2024/03/south-koreas-growing-support-for-taiwan-signals-regional-shift/
[12] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/final-ASEAN-FMs-Statement-on-Cross-strait-development.pdf
