- The author is the president of Center for Iranian Studies (IRAM)
ISTANBUL
Years of speculation over who would succeed Ali Khamenei -- who had led Iran's Supreme Leadership since 1989 until his death in a US-Israeli strike on February 28 -- came to an end on March 9, when the Assembly of Experts selected Mojtaba Khamenei as his father's successor.
With no government experience to his name, Mojtaba's selection appears to have been driven less by forward-looking strategic thinking than by a desire to neutralize factional disputes within the system. Compared to other prospective candidates, he is seen as a less politicized and less divisive figure. Questions of merit, however, seem destined to remain a subject of ongoing debate.
The conditions enshrined in Article 109 of Iran's Constitution -- which defines the qualifications required of the Supreme Leader, or Vali-ye Faqih -- were, from the very beginning, wrapped in considerable ambiguity: religious scholarship, justice, piety, "sound" political and social judgment, courage, and administrative ability.
This debate first erupted, in its sharpest form, during the deliberations that ended with Ali Khamenei's selection by the Assembly of Experts the day after Ayatollah Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989. Rising to speak in the middle of those proceedings, Khamenei opened with a striking admission: "The very fact that someone like me is being considered for this position should move us to tears over the state of the Islamic community." He went on to declare himself unworthy of the office, suggesting that his election would be technically problematic, and concluded: "If I am chosen, this will be a leadership in name only -- not a real one."
These remarks can, of course, be interpreted as an expression of taarof -- the deeply rooted Iranian tradition of ritual self-deprecation -- or as a straightforward display of mahviyyat, the norm of not openly pursuing high office. Even so, those who genuinely believed at the time that Khamenei lacked the qualifications for the role were far from few. The same doubts now attach themselves to his son.
Given the pressures Iran is currently under, Mojtaba Khamenei's election has not yet become the subject of open public debate -- but as the war recedes, that conversation will grow louder. In the meantime, Iran faces a cascade of critical decisions at home and abroad, with the conduct and eventual end of the war at the top of the agenda. The choices Mojtaba Khamenei makes in the months ahead will be consequential -- for his own legitimacy no less than for the future of Iran.
Is the new leader a "hardliner"?
It is worth emphasizing upfront that any label attached to Mojtaba Khamenei's political leanings at this stage carries little weight beyond speculation. Although he has occasionally been described as a quiet power behind the institution of the Supreme Leadership, Iran's new 57-year-old leader never publicly defined his positions -- even as his country passed through some of its most consequential moments in recent memory. His retreat into religious scholarship in Qom, Iran's preeminent center of clerical learning, could itself be read as a form of deliberate obscurity. Put simply, Mojtaba Khamenei has cultivated a posture of studied detachment from politics.
Contrary to what much of the Western media has been asserting over the past two days, there is no concrete basis for labeling Mojtaba Khamenei a "hardliner." Nor does the political and sociological reality Iran currently faces leave much room for such an approach. Iran under his leadership will therefore need to chart a course on the domestic front that is grounded in that reality. To do so, the younger Khamenei will need to pass three tests.
The first: he will have to govern a system he does not fully control -- in the near term, at least -- with little to no opportunity to place his own people in key positions, assuming such a network exists at all. Consolidating his footing in Tehran's ferociously competitive political arena will be anything but straightforward. Claims that he has periodically exerted influence within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could prove to be an asset -- or a liability, should the Guards choose to exploit the transition to expand their own grip on the system.
The second test is one of social legitimacy. Despite facing fierce criticism throughout his tenure -- especially after 2009 -- Ali Khamenei nonetheless held a genuine base of public support. Rallies in support of Mojtaba Khamenei have taken place in the squares of Tehran and other cities since the announcement, and those who backed his father were, at their core, backers of the Islamic Republic as a system. Even so, whatever social credit the father earned will not pass automatically to the son. Iran's new leader risks being eclipsed by other senior clerics. The position of Ayatollah Sistani -- based in neighboring Iraq and recognized as a supreme religious authority by millions of Shia Muslims worldwide -- adds a dimension to this question that deserves separate treatment altogether.
The third test is institutional. Iran has long wrestled with a persistent debate over the steep power asymmetry between the Supreme Leader and the President -- an imbalance rooted largely in the constitution, and partly in how it has been read and applied -- which leaves the presidency with a notably restricted set of powers. This friction surfaced, in one form or another, in the relationship between Ali Khamenei and nearly every president who served alongside him: Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani. The one exception was Ibrahim Raisi, the eighth president, elected in 2021, who died in a helicopter crash in May 2024 before completing his first term. Iran's current president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has not shown the same appetite for confrontation as his predecessors, yet factions within the system seeking to expand their influence will be looking to turn this transitional moment to their advantage.
Nonetheless, the most pressing challenge awaiting Iran's new Supreme Leader, however, will be the conditions born of the war that began on February 28.
Where is Iranian foreign policy headed?
Much as his father came to power in the wake of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 -- during much of which he had served as president -- Mojtaba Khamenei will inherit an Iran exhausted by war and compelled to forge new strategies. But before any of that becomes possible, he first needs to ensure the country's survival and, more urgently, bring the war to an end. In a statement on March 10, US President Donald Trump said he was disappointed by Mojtaba Khamenei's selection, believing it would perpetuate the same problems in Iran -- yet he also noted that the operation was "pretty much" at its end and that the war would be over "very soon."
Iran's newly installed leader needs to secure a ceasefire as quickly as possible to prevent further devastation and loss of life. Türkiye's active diplomatic engagement with all parties in pursuit of a negotiated solution, alongside pressure from Russia and even some of Iran's Gulf neighbors on the United States, could all play a facilitating role in this process. Repairing relations with the neighbors Iran targeted in retaliation for US and Israeli strikes, however, will have no easy path. This, too, will be one of the defining tests awaiting Mojtaba Khamenei.
Suspicion and distrust have long defined Iran's relationships with virtually all of these states. Nor is it any secret that these countries view Iran as a security risk, given its regional policies and its ties to non-state armed groups.
Iran's decision to strike civilian areas -- not just US military installations -- in these countries took that perception to an entirely different level. Iran will need to reckon with this new reality and rebuild its relationships with its neighbors on more honest terms, security included. Much the same applies to Türkiye, if not in identical fashion.
From the start, Türkiye has held a consistent line -- voiced at the highest level by President Erdoğan himself -- condemning both the US-Israeli strikes on Iran and Iran's retaliatory targeting of neighboring states. Ankara has handled the missiles fired from Iranian territory that are intercepted in Turkish airspace carefully to avoid further escalation. For Iran under Mojtaba Khamenei, deepening ties with Türkiye will carry strategic weight -- both bilaterally and for Iran's wider standing in the region and beyond.
A new chapter in Iran has opened with Mojtaba Khamenei's rise to the Supreme Leadership. The decisions he make will determine whether his leadership is one of form or of genuine substance. He inherits from his predecessor an Iran whose system remains intact but is frayed in many ways -- a society ground down by war and sanctions. The new Supreme Leader will need not only sound political judgment, but the courage and administrative capacity to act on it. Without these qualities, the quiet opposition at home and the hostile environment abroad could together saddle him with a burden he cannot carry. Iran's new leader needs time -- and time may be precisely what Iran has least of right now.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
