In an interview with Anadolu's Strategic Analysis Department, Nico Lange, a former chief of staff for the German defense minister and currently senior fellow at the Munich Security Conference, assessed shifting transatlantic dynamics, Europe's evolving security posture under the return of President Donald Trump, and Türkiye’s pivotal role in shaping the continent's strategic future.
ISTANBUL
ANADOLU: At the 2025 Munich Security Conference, US Vice President JD Vance's appearance was widely seen as a symbolic display of Washington's growing distance from its transatlantic allies. So in this context, how have Europe's strategic priorities evolved in response to Donald Trump's return to the US presidency?
Lange: The Europeans need the US. It's in the interest of Germany and of the NATO Europeans to have a good relationship with them. And in that interest, we have to be calm about many things that are being said in Washington, DC, speeches that are given. Even if we disagree with some of the content, we still have an interest in working together. There is one significant change. Before the Munich Security Conference, there was a consensus in Europe that the Europeans in NATO would spend more on defense and they would spend much of the money in the US. I think after the conference, the consensus is emerging that the NATO Europeans will spend more money on defense, but they will do everything they can not to spend the money in the US.
So from the perspective of US defense industry, at least, JD Vance was not doing a favor to American interests. From the perspective of strength of the Europeans in NATO, we know that sometimes the Europeans, unfortunately, need an external shock to get better. And it seems that the Trump administration, in its current incarnation, is giving this external shock to the Europeans.
Q: Discussions around the creation of a European army have gained renewed momentum. To what extent are proposals for a unified European army driving driven by concrete institutional reforms versus political rhetoric? Is Europe really trying to form a European army? Or do they do they serve to a different goal, such as keeping the US in NATO?
Lange: I think the idea of a European army is only used by political decision-makers who want to paint a nice picture and not do anything. What we really see is that all the European NATO member states are strengthening their national armed forces, arms industries, and defense technology. And that is a significant development. So the European members of NATO, they are getting stronger. At the same time, they are trying to do everything they can to keep the US engaged in Europe. But this is something completely different than building a European army or armed forces. And it's clear it's the European members of NATO, because there is a romantic understanding of the EU doing things in defense and building a European army. But that is not what is happening and what is bringing concrete results. But the Europeans and NATO are really getting stronger. But by the way, when I talk about the Europeans and NATO having an interest to have close cooperation with the US, it's also true that the Europeans in NATO who are getting stronger also have a strong interest in cooperation with a NATO partner, Türkiye.
Q: Europe is redefining its security architecture. So how could Türkiye contribute to shaping a new vision of European security? What frameworks or what mechanisms might underpin such a cooperation?
Lange: First of all, I believe it's a vital interest for Germany and for all Europeans in NATO to have cooperation with Türkiye that is as good as possible. And saying this is in our interest also means even if the Turkish leadership does things that we don’t fully agree with, the interest is still there and it's an overarching interest to cooperate. In practical terms, I think the most immediate interest is to be engaged with Türkiye about possible conversations between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, for everyone else in the region – and also for the future security of Europe, especially after a potential ceasefire in Ukraine – cooperation with Türkiye on Black Sea security will be essential. We have a strong interest in that. That’s one important area.
The second area that I would like to mention is we need industrial and technological partnerships for our security. In many dimensions I think Türkiye has demonstrated that it made advances in certain technologies, drones, autonomous systems, AI-supported command and control, but also mass production, and many European countries are still struggling with that. So I see areas of cooperation here. I think it's good that Türkiye is procuring Eurofighter planes. It's a good element of cooperation. And I think we need more of this practical technological and industrial cooperation for our security. And again, I mean, if you look at dimensions such as autonomous systems of maritime surveillance, protection of maritime infrastructure, underwater cables, all of this must be an area of cooperation.
And then then maybe the third and last point, political cooperation with Türkiye. This is something that is also a bridge into a discussion about stabilizing regions from which Germany is receiving a lot of migrants. German migration policy is changing. But for those changes to be successful, I think the cooperation between Germany and Türkiye in that sector of security plays a crucial role.
Q: What are differences between former Chancellor Olaf Scholz's government and current Chancellor Friedrich Merz's government in relation to their ideological or practical approaches to Türkiye?
Lange: I have reasons to believe that the Merz government (for the first time in many years, Germany has a foreign minister from the chancellor's party) has more of an inclination to have an interest based policy with Türkiye in the sense that I described having an overarching interest of working together. You never know about the chemistry between people.
So I think we all have to learn how Chancellor Merz and President Erdogan are getting along with each other. I'm sure that Türkiye is on a high priority for Friedrich Merz of the countries to go early in his chancellorship. So I think there is good will to make it work. But we do have the personal chemistry that we don't know. I mentioned Türkiye being the platform for Russia-Ukraine talks. I think Germany behind the scenes is ready to assist Türkiye or to help Türkiye with whatever is needed to keep this platform going, keep the conversation going. And Germany I think is, interested in Türkiye being the prime place for those kinds of conversations.
Let's find out, I'm sure, the German foreign minister will be in Türkiye soon. And, of course, there will be close German-Turkish consultations and maybe German, British, French, and Turkish consultations leading up to the NATO summit in The Hague. Because what we need from the NATO summit in The Hague is a signal of partnership not only between the Europeans, we also have to show that the European partners of NATO, together with Türkiye, are in close cooperation about security in Europe
