The author is chief foreign news correspondent at Anadolu
ISTANBUL
The dizzying pace of tension and subsequent reconciliation between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in January served as a catalyst, realigning not only the Syrian theater but also regional Kurdish geopolitics. However, during this process, the stance taken by KDP leader Masoud Barzani and northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), along with the rhetoric of the Iraqi Kurdish media, reignited the debate: "Is there a thaw in relations between Barzani and the PKK?"
Answering with superficial reflexes, the response is yes. However, when addressed through the lens of historical competition in the Kurdish political sphere, the cult of leadership, and regional power balances, the answer is no. As with many regional events, reading intra-Kurdish relations through emotional and ideological lenses leads to misconceptions.
The new resolution process: Expanding the KDP's maneuvering room
The "Terror-Free Türkiye" initiative, envisioning the PKK's disarmament and dissolution alongside democratic reforms, is triggering a transformation beyond Ankara’s security doctrine to influence the entire Kurdish political sphere in the Middle East. This process is reshaping Ankara's engagement with Kurdish actors, as well as the long-standing dynamics of rivalry, conflict, and cooperation among those actors. While the entire political spectrum in the KRG voiced support for the process, the KDP and the Barzani family, in particular, are once again assuming a "mediator" role, as they did during the resolution process that ended in 2015.
Until this phase, the KDP had been in active conflict with the PKK, collaborating with Türkiye against the group in northern Iraq, and maintaining a cold distance from Mazloum Abdi and the YPG. However, within this new climate, the KDP – Ankara’s closest Kurdish ally – has adopted a tactical shift toward the PKK and its Syrian affiliates. In an environment where Ankara has ceased active hostilities and is seeking a settlement, the KDP is not expected to remain in conflict with the organization or its offshoots. By hosting Abdi and other key figures in Erbil and Duhok, the KDP both reinforces its mediator role and attempts to position itself and the KRG as the center of Kurdish geopolitics.
The Barzani leadership harbors long-standing ambitions for groups like the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) to have a definitive say in Syria’s future. Consequently, their rhetoric supporting a successful integration between Damascus and the SDF should not be misinterpreted as supporting the PKK; rather, it is a calculated move indexed to securing Kurdish rights within a post-conflict environment.
While the SDF historically refused to share power with the ENKS or the Barzanis in northern Syria, a new equation is emerging. As the SDF’s exclusive influence wanes and the Damascus administration's authority grows, a window of opportunity may open for the KDP. This shift offers the potential – albeit limited in the short term – to carve out a political foothold for pro-Barzani factions within the "New Syria."
Anxiety of being left out
The Barzani family is among the "founding fathers" of Kurdish political movements in the region. In this regard, Masoud Barzani is not merely the KDP’s leader, but the preeminent representative of this legacy. Defining his political identity through an authority rooted in family, tribe, and geography rather than conventional party leadership, Barzani employs a nationalist rhetoric. The 2005 formation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) bolstered the family's standing regionally.
Historically, relations between the PKK and the Barzanis have been fraught with tension, save for brief periods of tactical rapprochement until Ankara's most recent initiative. Consequently, assessments suggesting that the Barzani administration’s ties with the PKK are "strengthening" are often based on a flawed premise. For Barzani, the PKK remains an ideological rival – and even a threat. However, the SDF's emergence as a permanent actor in Syria, coupled with the symbolism it has cultivated within Kurdish public opinion through a narrative of "resistance," prevents Barzani from taking a confrontational stance.
In this context, Barzani’s current engagement with the PKK is not a rapprochement, but rather a strategic effort to avoid being sidelined in the Syrian theater. While Barzani views the prospect of the PKK becoming a legitimate reference point for regional Kurdish politics as antithetical to the KDP’s and KRG’s interests, he no longer possesses the tools to fully neutralize that risk.
The territorial gains made by the PKK during the Syrian civil war, the international legitimacy it garnered via the SDF, and Qandil's capacity for ideological expansion have begun to shrink the geographical boundaries of Barzani's influence. Evidence of this includes the PKK's refusal to grant political maneuverability to pro-Barzani parties in northern Syria, its marginalization of the ENKS, its suppression of Kurdish media outlets like Rudaw, and its occupation of hundreds of villages within the KRG.
The KRG leadership and media's "over-enthusiastic" embrace of the Damascus-SDF tensions must be viewed within this framework. Furthermore, PUK-aligned media narratives exert indirect pressure on the KDP. While the Sulaymaniyah-based political establishment has long maintained a stronger rapport with the PKK, Barzani realizes that being excluded risks relegating him to a "minor actor" in the broader Kurdish cause.
The region's emerging geopolitics favor strong central states, while the space for sub-state actors is steadily diminishing. This trend – marked by the weakening of entities like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis since October 2023, and persistent calls to rein in the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq – has culminated in the PKK disarmament process, further underscored by US declarations that it no longer requires the SDF. Consequently, a necessity has arisen to find common ground, at least rhetorically, on perceived threats to regional Kurdish geopolitics. Rather than being remembered as the actor that stood idle during a crisis, the KRG appears willing to embrace these political risks. Nearing the age of 80, Barzani aims to rebrand his leadership through the lens of Kurdish unity. While he has not abandoned the ideal of an "independent Kurdistan," he recognizes current regional realities: the only viable path is for Kurds to remain powerful within the existing systems of the countries they inhabit. In this light, KRG President Nechirvan Barzani's recurring calls since the Assad regime’s fall for the SDF to "go to Damascus and join the political process" gain new significance – prioritizing political status over armed militancy.
Leadership cults and geopolitical rivalry
The KDP, founded in 1946 by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, stands as the first modern Kurdish political movement. Abdullah Öcalan's founding of the PKK followed three decades later; nonetheless, the PKK line has consistently characterized the Barzani school as "tribal and feudal." Leaked notes from Öcalan reveal sharp criticisms of Barzani, while senior PKK figures like Mustafa Karasu have gone as far as to claim that the KRG flag does not represent all Kurds but elites. Beyond rhetoric, the organization launched numerous political and military incursions against the KDP. Simultaneously, the PKK employed various tactics to poison the Ankara-KDP relationship.
While the PKK’s activities in Iraq have not yielded a formal political output, the rivalry between Barzani and Öcalan – contemporaries separated by only a year in age – now plays out in Syria. A notable detail following the recent Damascus-YPG tensions in Aleppo was the prevalence of the KRG flag, rather than party banners, during protests across KRG cities.
The developments in Syria reignited the question: "Who will be the regional Kurdish leader?" Masoud Barzani has long maintained that there will be no more "birakuji" (internecine war). Yet, the PKK regularly tests this pledge. While the PKK asserts ideological leadership through the cult of Öcalan, Barzani derives his authority from historical legitimacy and established institutional structures. However, in modern Kurdish geopolitics, symbols, military capacity, and international visibility have begun to eclipse traditional dynastic leadership. Thus, Barzani's recent maneuvers do not represent a "shift toward the PKK," but a forced adaptation to redefine his sphere of influence.
Masoud Barzani is not seeking an ideological alliance with the PKK; he is revising his nationalist reflexes to avoid losing his claim to regional leadership. While this causes friction with Türkiye, it is unsurprising given the current power dynamics.
The closest the Kurds have come to an independent state was the 2017 independence referendum, which Barzani championed but which ultimately failed. Today, that goal remains distant. Barzani's latest moves point toward an approach aimed at expanding Kurdish power within existing state structures rather than pursuing Kurdish unity. By emphasizing Kurdish unity, his objective is to increase his own ideological reach and the strategic depth of the KRG. Consequently, the rivalry for the soul of Kurdish politics in Syria is only just beginning.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
