The author is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Hasan Kalyoncu University and SETA Senior Researcher.
ISTANBUL
US President Trump is simultaneously making statements both advocating for continuing the war and for ending it through diplomacy. As contradictions persist between these statements — and between rhetoric and actions -- the future direction of the war has become a major point of curiosity. Indeed, after Trump's comments about talks with Iran, Netanyahu announced that attacks on Iran would continue, while US Central Command reported that strikes were being carried out intensively on that very same night.
Energy prices and global inflation expectations are becoming a reality, and the costs of the war have already increased. While Gulf countries are still recovering from the shock of the war, a ground operation could push the conflict into an "irreversible" new phase. Once American troops set foot on Iranian soil, diplomatic efforts to stop the war will become nearly impossible. In other words, the nature of the conflict could extend well beyond air and missile strikes and air defense battles. Therefore, it is crucial to first assess the military and strategic risks of the conflict.
What kind of military and strategic risks would a potential US ground operation against Iran entail?
The nature of ground operations adheres to principles rooted in thousands of years of military experience. Within this framework, a ground operation must primarily serve a clear political goal and target a specific objective. However, the political aim of the US/Israeli intervention against Iran remains uncertain. While regime change through popular uprising has initially been considered, other objectives -- such as targeting nuclear and missile programs -- have also been put forward. The absence of a clearly defined goal has disrupted military planning, producing a military posture that no longer aligns with its original purpose and diminishing its intended strategic impact.
It is clear that conducting a ground operation requires a comprehensive military ecosystem -- not just a few divisions -- and that deploying insufficient forces would prevent achieving the necessary concentration and balance. This is the core risk of force imbalance. Such a limited ground invasion would likely result only in casualties without achieving meaningful objectives. Meanwhile, Iran would retain the capacity to respond militarily while simultaneously leveraging its energy resources and threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz.
Controlling the Strait of Hormuz and the nearby islands would compel Iran to respond with force, potentially drawing it into attacks that could damage its own energy infrastructure. Whether US forces could hold those islands -- which would fall within range of Iranian rockets and missiles -- under an air umbrella remains a serious operational question. Another option, a ground incursion into western Iran through Kurdish-populated territory, could escalate into sustained ground combat despite strong air cover. Either way, a ground operation aimed at seizing and holding territory is unlikely to be sustainable.
In this context, any potential ground operation must be planned around a realistic and clearly defined political objective. Without one, strategic faults cannot be corrected through tactical military measures alone. The United States would then face costs it cannot tolerate: military casualties, a disruption of energy flows, and a loss of international prestige. Military casualties, in particular, would lock the conflict into an irreversible trajectory while simultaneously reinforcing conditions under which Iran moves to halt energy flows across the Gulf entirely.
What would be the military, political, and economic costs of a potential ground operation for the United States?
US military casualties represent the primary cost that would push the war into an irreversible phase. Such losses -- which could erode Trump's already fragile public support -- would strengthen the argument that "American soldiers are being sacrificed for Israel." Consequently, the scale of military casualties could drive political radicalization and prolong the war. A prolonged conflict, in turn, would intensify the economic costs considerably.
Alongside the $200 billion budget request from the US Congress, the planned $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027 represents an enormous fiscal burden. With an annual trade deficit of $1.2 trillion and a national debt of $38 trillion, the US faces the prospect of even larger deficits ahead. Trump, who emphasizes competition with China, risks misallocating the tax burden on American citizens -- redirecting resources toward military spending that yields no tangible economic return, rather than toward productive growth, thereby fueling a prolonged war of attrition. While Iran can justify its deteriorating economic posture through the logic of existential self-defense, the American public will scrutinize the Trump administration on both its support for Israel and the financial costs of the Iran conflict.
Rising military and economic costs, compounded by public reactions reminiscent of the Vietnam War era, could significantly worsen the political environment. Domestic backlash driven by anti-Israel sentiment might threaten the AIPAC-backed bipartisan political establishment. Therefore, a ground operation in western Iran or along the Strait of Hormuz is not feasible for the United States from a military, economic, or political standpoint.
How could a US ground operation impact the regional balance of power?
Anger toward Iran among Gulf states has reached levels comparable to their frustration with the United States itself. Despite the UAE's broadly pro-Israel stance, Saudi Arabia -- with its $1.27 trillion economy -- is expected to pursue a new security and defense architecture alongside Türkiye, Pakistan, and other Gulf nations. The security of Gulf states, whose governing regimes had long relied on American security guarantees, has been shaken, rather than receiving protection, they are now witnessing the withdrawal of US bases from their soil.
Since a ground operation is widely regarded as a worst-case scenario, inflation driven by global energy and economic disruptions could become unpredictable. Petrochemical-dependent GDP figures may decline sharply, currency instability will make servicing foreign debt more challenging, and stock market downturns could signal broader financial distress. Developing and underdeveloped countries with weak reserves will be the first to suffer, but global inflation will ultimately become unsustainable for the United States as well. American consumers -- who import goods at a rate far exceeding their export of services -- will be among the first to feel the effects of rising prices. A ground operation that cannot be concluded quickly will therefore send ripple effects through energy markets and the global economy, straining both household and government budgets alike.
Conclusion
Rather than allowing this conflict to drag on at enormous cost to the US and the world, it is far more rational to pursue a diplomatic resolution and address outstanding issues through dialogue. Peace and reconciliation -- too valuable to be sacrificed to any one party's security obsessions -- must be pursued with both courage and common sense. The costs are too high for the US, Israel, Iran, or any other country to bear indefinitely. History has consistently shown that orders established through war are temporary, while peace built through dialogue endures. Therefore, rather than attempting to impose political will on Iran through a ground operation, managing this process through compromise and negotiation is in everyone's best interest.
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.
