Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University, and an adjunct fellow at the American Security Project.
What Saudi Arabia can expect from the United States while under attack by Iran’s allies is unclear today. The Saudi-Houthi conflict, which entered a period of relative calm after the April 2022 truce [1], erupted [2] again in July, with Ansar Allah recently striking what it describes [3] as “sensitive sites” inside Riyadh while pressing its offensive along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and deeper into the country’s interior. The stakes are extremely high.
With the Strait of Hormuz already under intense pressure, the Houthis’ new control [4] over the Bab al-Mandab Strait threatens another vital artery of global commerce. The chokepoint is particularly important to Saudi Arabia because it provides maritime access between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, including a route for Saudi energy exports to markets in Europe and Asia that can bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
Yet as the fighting intensifies, Riyadh has found Washington unwilling to cross the line from providing intelligence and targeting assistance to conducting strikes of its own against the Houthis. The contrast with 1990–91 is stark. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and posed a direct threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, the George H. W. Bush administration responded with overwhelming force, deploying [5] more than half a million troops to Saudi Arabia and assembling an international coalition to drive Iraq’s occupying forces from Kuwait.
Shifting dynamics in the US-Saudi partnership
Today, despite the close personal relationship between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the White House has resisted Riyadh’s calls for direct American military intervention, raising questions about the limits of Washington’s security commitment to its Gulf ally. Rather than expanding the US role in the conflict, the Trump administration appears to be weighing the strategic and political costs of further escalation with Iran, including the potential economic repercussions and domestic political pressures that could intensify as the November midterm elections approach.
In this instance, the Trump administration seems to be prioritizing the protection of core American interests, particularly freedom of navigation, while leaving Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies to confront the Houthis. Yet Trump has faced mounting pressure from Riyadh to assume a more direct military role. After Salman urged him to authorize US strikes against the Houthis, Trump reportedly considered [6] military options before ultimately deciding against direct US action, instead expanding [7] intelligence and targeting support.
For Riyadh, the deeper significance of Washington’s refusal may therefore lie in what the episode reveals about the limits of the US-Saudi partnership. The Saudi leadership has long regarded Washington as the Kingdom’s ultimate external security partner, and Trump’s decision not to intervene directly has fueled much anger in Saudi Arabia. It has also reinforced a widespread view in Saudi Arabia that the White House is underestimating the strategic value of a historic relationship whose foundations date back to the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency.
Nonetheless, even with no easy options at its disposal, Riyadh will have little choice but to act pragmatically in the face of continued attacks by the Houthis and other Iranian allies. The current hostilities between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia are likely to reinforce Riyadh’s longstanding efforts to diversify its international partnerships and reduce its dependence on Washington—a trend that was already well underway long before fighting with the Houthis resumed in July.
Yet Saudi policymakers also recognize the limits of that strategy. For all the uncertainties and shortcomings surrounding US security guarantees, there remains no credible substitute for Washington, as no other power in the world currently possesses both the military capabilities and willingness to assume the role the United States has long played as the GCC members’ principal external security partner.
Long term security for Saudi Arabia
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia must realize the inherent risks of allowing its long-term security to rest indefinitely on the protection of an external guarantor. A more durable regional order would require the states of the Gulf and the broader Middle East to assume greater responsibility for their own security—anchored in mutual non-aggression agreements, confidence-building measures, and a shared commitment to preserving peace and stability in their immediate neighborhood.
As Trita Parsi has articulated [8], this vision calls for an inclusive, collectively governed regional security order that transcends rigid geopolitical blocs, moving beyond a system of externally backed alliances and deterrence toward durable regional institutions capable of managing and containing rivalries. Such a security order would include Iran as a full participant, while providing a pathway for Israel’s inclusion contingent on an end to its illegal occupation of land outside its UN-recognized borders, alongside greater strategic autonomy for the GCC states.
At its core would be a framework bringing together Iran, Türkiye, Iraq, and the Gulf Arab monarchies through mechanisms for communication during times of crisis, military deconfliction, conflict prevention, mediation, arms control, confidence-building, and cooperation on shared challenges ranging from water scarcity and climate change to economic development.
Under such an arrangement, the United States would remain a close diplomatic and economic partner of Saudi Arabia and the five other GCC members, providing security assistance when collectively requested by the regional actors, but would no longer serve as their permanent military guarantor. To be sure, the emergence of this order would not erase Saudi Arabia’s security concerns regarding Iran or the Houthis. Nor would it eliminate the rivalries and mistrust that continue to shape the geopolitically complicated Middle East. It could, however, create the institutional mechanisms needed to contain tensions before they spiral out of control.
[1] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/yemens-warring-parties-agree-to-two-month-truce-un-says
[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemeni-military-targets-sanaa-airport-runway-stop-iranian-plane-landing-defence-2026-07-13/
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/19/houthis-claim-attacks-sensitive-sites-saudi-arabian-capital/
[4] https://abcnews.com/video/136590684/
[5] https://www.war.gov/News/Feature-Stories/story/Article/1728715/desert-storm-a-look-back/
[6] https://www.axios.com/2026/09/21/trump-houthis-yemen-saudi-bin-salman
[7] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/us-military-support-saudi-arabia-houthi-iran-yemen
[8] https://tritaparsi.substack.com/p/saudi-yemen-conflict-the-notion-of
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
