OPINION - Trump's return and its impact on Türkiye-Africa relations

• Juxtaposed with 'virtuous power' and 'benevolent state' paradigm, Ankara could have the chance to upgrade its aid model through the catch-all term of 'Turkish-type development assistance model'

The author is a postdoctoral researcher at Harvard University's African Studies Center.

ISTANBUL

From a real estate merchant to the US president, Donald Trump entered the political arena in 2016 with swift success, stunning local and international observers. His first election victory was highly improbable [1] according to opinion in the US, given the overwhelming reality that candidates with no government or military experience had ever been chosen. President Donald Trump's first tenure, ipso facto, was equally unconventional, and he put his stamp on history by facing two impeachment trials [2] for abuse of power - and escaping unscathed. This time around, however, the president's triumph did not surprise many. His new term is expected to be met with less resistance, as his party has won both [3] chambers of Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate.

What could Trump's full control of Washington mean for the Africa in general, and Türkiye-Africa relations in particular? Is there a glimmer of hope or looming despair on the horizon? Though no one can predict what will happen, some indications can be derived by decoding his first term's economic, military, political and personal results.

China-Africa relations

First and foremost, China will likely be the epicenter of Trump's foreign policy focus, since he has made no secret of his intention to adopt a hardline stance [4] on the country, regardless of its economic, demographic and geopolitical potential. Approaching a "zero-sum game" strategy with China, new tensions over trade, technology and the Taiwan issue will likely be unveiled. This could spur China to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy to counter the US containment strategy. Africa will be influenced by such tension, as Beijing sees the continent as the "base" from which a rising China could best extend its global power. China's keenness to become a leading global actor comes during Trump's America First focus and will be materialized through deepening ties [5] in Africa.

China-US competition will ultimately pose various challenges for African states, requiring them to maintain a state of economic preparedness for unexpected challenges. China's unyielding Africa policy could thus confine foreign actors, including Turkish firms and companies operating in Africa. Conversely, new market conditions are likely to create different opportunities for Turkish companies, though. The latest trend in Türkiye's trade relations [6] with African countries, which increased nearly eight-fold over the past 20 years, from $5.4 billion in 2003 to $41.3 billion in 2023, may change.

Foreign aid

Foreign aid will be another issue at stake in Türkiye-Africa relations during Trump's second period. Africa generally receives a large share of annual US humanitarian assistance, and around 70% of this goes to health programs. In his first term, Trump made sweeping cuts [7] to the US Agency for International Development and withdrew funding from health organizations.

US aid flow to Africa, which currently stands at around $8 billion annually, [8] is likely to be cut by 30% in Trump's second term. Cuts to programs such as PEPFAR (the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), will especially disrupt vaccination and AIDS programs in Africa. As Africa braces for these cuts, Türkiye could extend its footprint on this issue, portraying itself as a great emerging donor of its own accord. Turkish Official Development Assistance (ODA), which began at $85 million in 2002, amounted to nearly $8 billion [9] in 2022. Juxtaposed with the "virtuous power" and "benevolent state" paradigm, Ankara could have the chance to upgrade its aid model through the catch-all term of "Turkish-type development assistance model" (TDAM), but this could burden the country with additional economic costs.

Political wrangling

The net effect of Trump's second term could also lead to a political crisis in Africa. In particular, the Israel-Palestine conflict has shaken the political landscape of US-Africa relations. South Africa's anti-Israel stance on the Gaza issue, Egypt's friction with Israel, Gulf countries' new Horn of Africa policy and Sudan's deadlock could propel Trump to adapt and react to new regional geopolitics. In this equation, in line with Gulf countries, Trump could prioritize some countries and establish closer ties with certain African countries in return for Israel rapprochement.

However, a regional thaw that started with the Türkiye-led Somalia-Ethiopia Ankara Declaration [10] will create alliances with neighboring countries, since new condition in the region is not conducive to the first period of Trump's political equilibrium or compromise. Despite achieving large increases in the US defense budget during his first term in office, Trump paid less, if not any, attention to US military presence in Africa. Apparently, on a whim, he even went further by withdrawing [11] American troops from Somalia, where they were involved in fighting piracy and the war against al-Shabaab.

As the threat posed by terrorist organizations continues to evolve in Africa, Trump's military policy in his second term will be closely followed by local and international actors. Being an ally in NATO, Türkiye-US military cooperation could deepen, as Türkiye extended support to repel terrorist attacks orchestrated by Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam Wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Boko Haram and al-Shabaab.

Russia factor

Although Middle East allies will be eager for the US to protect its military base in Djibouti, a potential military disengagement of the US could certainly create a vacuum that Moscow will be keen to exploit. Therefore, Trump's military steps likely present Russia with a major defense opportunity to expand its stimulus over the continent. The retreat of Russian forces in Syria revealed a "Saigon Moment" [12] for Russia to halt the war in Ukraine. If the conflict ends, Russia will have a chance to deploy more security insight towards Africa. This could open new avenues for both Türkiye and Russia to expand their military engagement more deeply and comprehensively in the continent to tackle current challenges, particularly in the Sahel region.

The competition between the US, China and Russia in Africa will create both a fertile new set of relationships for economic leverage and a whole set of new complex challenges within it. Importantly, these opportunities depend to a large degree on how Türkiye will apply its capability through its political, military and humanitarian role.

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly2818j7rko

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html

[3] https://www.npr.org/2024/11/06/g-s1-32961/up-first-newsletter-donald-trump-second-term-senate-gop-control-reproductive-rights

[4] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/13/trump-signals-hard-line-on-china-with-hawkish-cabinet-picks

[5] https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2024/10/africa-is-chinas-testing-ground-for-overseas-military-missions

[6] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkiye-eyes-50b-trade-goal-with-africa-as-lesothos-premier-pays-visit/3398049

[7] https://www.care.org/media-and-press/trump-administration-announces-devastating-cuts-to-u-s-foreign-assistance/

[8] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/9/with-trump-win-africa-braces-for-aid-cuts-uncertainty

[9] https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/net-official-development-assistance-and-official-aid-received-us-dollar-wb-data.html

[10] https://www.mfa.gov.tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/world/africa/trump-somalia-troop-withdrawal.html

[12] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/retreat-of-syrian-forces-threatens-saigon-moment-for-russia-c17ccc22

*Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Anadolu's editorial policy.