- Turkish UAS technology has been developed with an eye to combined arms warfare, counter-insurgency, and the need for exportable solutions to support a network of allies and partners
The author is a geopolitical analyst.
ISTANBUL
The helicopter crash that killed Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi [1] on May 19 prompted an urgent search to locate the wreckage in a remote area under difficult weather conditions. The result was confirmation of the death of Raisi and seven others on board. The crash revealed the relative dispensability of presidents in the Islamic Republic -- given the continuity of governance under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- and the indispensability of high-altitude long endurance (HALE) capabilities and all-weather optics in drones. The latter revelation indicates a steep difference between the goals and philosophies underpinning Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) development in Iran and Türkiye.
Türkiye: Rising drone superpower
Both countries have grabbed global headlines in recent years for their production and deployment of unmanned systems in active conflict zones. Turkish air and naval drones -- dozens of models from Baykar, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS), Meteksan, and others carrying products from ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, and dozens of Turkish firms -- have developed collectively into a national unmanned technology complex of impressive scope. Turkish drones have earned a reputation [2] for strong price/performance ratio, durability under combat conditions, and impressive instructional and training support. Turkish willingness to export such systems broadly and grant co-production rights to select partners in support of broader foreign policy goals has led some to dub Türkiye a “rising drone superpower.” [3]
Why Akinci was quickest and most effective way to locate the Raisi crash site?
Baykar’s Akinci is currently the apex product [4] from the suite of Turkish unmanned systems. It is a HALE UAS that can fly farther, faster, and higher than earlier Turkish models, and see and strike farther with a variety of sensors and munitions packages. It can perform many roles previously reserved for manned aircraft, including delivering large guided bombs and employing air-to-air missiles. Whereas Russian tactical adaptation to drone warfare -- more aggressive air defense and electronic warfare, especially -- has reduced the effectiveness of Baykar’s smaller TB2 UAS, the Akinci will pose a challenge [5] beyond the design parameters of current countermeasures. The 20-meter wingspan, satellite communications, diverse payloads, 40,000-foot ceiling, and 5,500-kilometer operational range are combined with a triple-redundant flight control system and artificial intelligence (AI)-powered avionics system.
These advanced capabilities make Akinci a potent addition to global battlefields -- and also made it the quickest and most effective way to locate the Raisi crash site. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated [6] that an Akinci flew over Iran’s East Azerbaijan province for 7.5 hours at Iranian request, covering 2,100 kilometers (and followed online by 200,000 users on the FlightRadar24 app). Iran produces many combat drones, but none have the size, durability, speed, and sensor quality to conduct search and rescue missions under adverse weather conditions too harsh for manned helicopters.
Few countries possess UAS fit for purpose under such conditions, but what is interesting about the Iranian case is Iran does, in fact, produce a very high quantity of its own drones -- just not under a philosophy that yields drones like the Akinci. Tehran’s programs [7] have favored kamikaze-type attack drones that explode on impact with targets rather than the more complicated business of tracking and delivering submunitions at moving targets; examples include the Ababil, Meraj, Mohajer, and Shahed systems, which can be fired en masse but not perform complicated tracking and precision strike. Tehran, prevented by sanctions from accessing important Western technologies and focused on a narrow band of asymmetric warfare tasks, [8] has produced a fleet of cheap, expendable, but limited-capacity drones.
The Raisi episode prompted a number of evasions and excuses [10] from Iranian sources, including claims that Iranian drones could have found the crash site had they not been deployed on exercises in the northern Indian Ocean and that the Turks violated trust by overlying sensitive sites. Iranian military sources subsequently alleged that the Akinci-provided coordinates were several kilometers off. Yet even allowing for some error by the Turkish drone and the potential capabilities of Iranian drones that could not deploy, the episode has left a major impression -- under the most sensitive conditions, one country could respond with an agile and effective unmanned solution, while the other could not.
To be fair to the Iranian drones, this is a comparison of apples and oranges. Turkish UAS technology has been developed with an eye to combined arms warfare, counter-insurgency, and the need for exportable solutions to support a network of allies and partners. Iranian UAS technology has been developed to evade the limitations of sanctions, provide asymmetric tools to proxy forces, and increase lethal effects for a single urgent purchaser (Russia). It may not be fair to expect the two programs to produce comparable systems or solutions. Yet we might fairly draw a conclusion nonetheless -- for regional actors searching for a drone approach suitable to demands other than those unique to Iran, the Turkish model provides a far greater value. And when the chips are down and urgent geopolitical equities are at play, it appears that even the Iranians recognize this.
[1] https://edition.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/raisi-iran-president-helicopter-crash-05-20-24/index.html
[2] https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/turkiyes-growing-drone-exports
[3] https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/415-turkey-and-the-tb-2-a-rising-drone-superpower/
[4] https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/bayraktar-akinci-unmanned-combat-aerial-vehicle-ucav/?cf-view
[5] https://guce.yahoo.com/consent?brandType=eu&gcrumb=YKqLrIQ&lang=en-GB&done=https%3A%2F%2Fuk.news.yahoo.com%2Fturkeys-bayraktar-tb2-drones-lost-231901876.html%3Fguccounter%3D1
[6] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/05/turkeys-fastest-drone-plays-key-role-locating-iran-helicopter-crash-site
[7] https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/feb/02/roster-iran’s-drones
[8] https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/what-a-turkish-drone-in-the-raisi-crash-crisis-reveals-about-irans-uav-capabilities/
[9] https://www.ft.com/content/170bc451-252d-4acb-80ea-43c0a6e19fc8
[10] https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2024/05/23/iran-may-unwittingly-boost-turkish-drone-and-american-missile-sales/?sh=8715b165698e
[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-armed-forces-downplay-role-turkish-drone-finding-presidents-crash-site-2024-05-22/
*Opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu.
