- Panel speakers urge deeper coordination from NATO to EU platforms, calling for reinforced early-warning systems
ISTANBUL
Turkish and European officials, diplomats, analysts, and industry experts gathered in Istanbul on Wednesday for the conference “Maritime Dimension of Energy Security in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea – Shared Challenges, Shared Horizons.”
The conference was co-organized by the Embassy of Poland in Ankara, the Polish Consulate General in Istanbul, and the Turkish Economic Development Foundation (IKV).
Discussions at the gathering underscored deepening vulnerabilities in Europe’s most critical maritime energy corridors, amid escalating hybrid threats, geopolitical tensions, and accelerating energy transition.
Opening the event, IKV Secretary-General Cigdem Nas emphasized the growing strategic weight of the maritime realm.
Maciej Lang, Poland's ambassador to Türkiye, underlined that security was a defining priority for Poland’s EU Council Presidency this January to July, citing the “resilience of energy supply chains and protection of critical infrastructure such as submarine communication fields.”
Stressing that maritime energy is equally vital for Türkiye, he added: “As old friends, solid partners, and reliable allies, Poland and Türkiye can contribute to strengthening connectivity and interoperability between the theatres of NATO's eastern flank.”
IKV Chair Ayhan Zeytinoglu drew parallels between the Baltic and Black Sea basins, warning of airspace incursions, cyberattacks, and undersea cable disruptions that have reshaped regional threat perceptions. Citing recent incidents involving Russian tankers near Türkiye’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), he called them “a dangerous escalation.”
Baltic Sea: A dense grid of risks
In a video address, Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) Director General Gustav Lindstrom described the region as “a chessboard for disruptive hybrid operations,” mentioning shadow fleets, GPS jamming, and the sabotage of undersea cables.
He highlighted the immense economic stakes, noting that damage to a major pipeline can cost as much as $87 million (€75 million) per day and require months of repair, while World War II munitions continue to complicate offshore wind expansion.
Rafal Hryniewiecki, the deputy director general of Poland’s Department of Economic Cooperation, stressed that Poland’s partnership with Türkiye is “remarkable” and “resilient” and rooted in six centuries of diplomatic ties.
He outlined Poland’s maritime energy strategy – from expanding liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities and offshore wind to strengthening NATO and CBSS coordination – and described Türkiye as a “strategic gateway for global energy flows.”
Poland’s new Secure Baltic act, he added, empowers the Polish Navy and Air Force to defend pipelines, cables, and offshore wind farms. “Shared risks demand shared responses,” he said.
Maja Urbanska, head of the EU Delegation to Türkiye Political Section, presented the EU’s tri-pillar strategy for the Black Sea, centered on resilience, connectivity, and environmental protection.
She detailed ongoing work on a Black Sea Maritime Security Hub integrating satellite data, vessel tracking, and coastal radar, alongside EU measures against the shadow fleet, which now includes 556 listed vessels.
Maciej Filip Bukowski, head of the Energy and Resilience Program of the Warsaw-based Casimir Pulaski Foundation, argued that the Baltic and Black Seas have become “the center of Europe’s strategic map as it changes and unfolds.”
The region’s vast pipeline and cable grids, he warned, face threats “that change faster than institutional reflexes.” He pointed to growing interdependence, hybrid intrusions, and the strategic centrality of both seas for half of Europe’s energy security.
Europe’s maritime backbone under strain
Moderated by Karol Wasilewski from the Center for Eastern Studies, the first panel compared Baltic and Black Sea vulnerabilities.
Zuzanna Nowak, executive director of the Warsaw-based Opportunity Institute for Foreign Affairs, noted Poland’s reliance on the Baltic has reached 48%, potentially rising above 60% as offshore wind and a coastal nuclear plant come online.
“The Baltic Sea has transformed into the densest energy-infrastructure hub,” she said, warning that even a single cable failure “could destabilize not just one country but the entire EU-linked system.” She argued that the Baltic and Black Seas “should be viewed as interconnected pillars of the same security architecture.”
Mitat Celikpala of Istanbul’s Kadir Has University outlined the Black Sea’s exposure to active conflict, asserting that policy for the region “cannot be shaped by the EU or major powers without Türkiye and local actors at the core.”
He highlighted interlinked vulnerabilities: offshore production near war zones, risks of Russian interdiction, mines, drone warfare, and exposed critical infrastructure from ports to pipelines.
Aylin Unver Noi of Istanbul’s Beykoz University traced Türkiye’s maritime posture from Ottoman–Russian rivalry to today’s subsea security challenges. With new deep-sea drilling capabilities and discoveries now covering 10% of Türkiye’s gas consumption, she stressed that underwater protection – amid drones, naval drones, and drifting mines – has become “a top priority.”
From the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Tymon Pastucha described the Baltic as a theater of continuous hybrid confrontation.
Diversification has sharply reduced Russia’s share of the regional energy supply, but Moscow’s shadow fleet, cyber tools and autonomous drones now seek to raise insurance premiums, delay energy investments, and sustain instability, he said. Incidents involving cable cuts or spills, he cautioned, could trigger cascading political and economic crises.
During a Q&A session, Celikpala stressed the need for clarity: “For the Americans it is a security vacuum; for Europeans it is partly inside Europe, partly outside. The question is whether the region is considered part of the European security architecture – and what role they see for Türkiye.”
Protecting sea lines of communication and energy infrastructure
A second panel moderated by Daniel Piekarski from Poland’s Foreign Ministry examined best practices and lessons for safeguarding LNG routes, subsea cables, and offshore wind systems.
Pinar Ipek of Ankara’s TOBB Economics and Technology University highlighted global chokepoints, noting that “Qatari LNG must pass through the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal.” As Europe phases out Russian supply, she said bottlenecks and capacity strain are growing.
Natural gas remains critical for grid stability during the energy transition, particularly in states lacking nuclear or hydropower, she said.
She argued that Black Sea states may gradually pivot from gas corridors to green-electricity exports via subsea cables originating in the Caspian. Restrictions on LNG transit through the Bosphorus, she added, make renewable expansion and cable protection even more essential.
Cybersecurity risks, often overlooked, were emphasized by Istanbul University’s Ozgun Erler Bayir, who called maritime cyber resilience “one of the least addressed dimensions” despite past examples such as the 2017 NotPetya ransomware attacks. Even minor intrusions, she warned, can create cascading failures across energy markets.
Journalist and independent energy analyst Wojciech Jakobik warned that Europe must prepare for deliberate escalation: “(What) if those aircraft flying meters above our platforms or those strange ships near our subsea cables actually do something — tomorrow?”
Poland’s resilience, he said, owes much to long-term diversification, including LNG contracts extending to 2043. Defending pipelines such as the Baltic Pipe Project requires protecting foreign segments as much as domestic ones.
From the private sector, Cansu Unal Ongoren, who sits on the board of Türkiye’s Reges Elektrik, stressed that offshore wind investment hinges on stable, predictable security conditions for at least 15 years. She advocated expanding AI-driven maritime monitoring: “The sea is a more unknown space than land, so early detection is crucial.”
During the Q&A, panelists urged stronger legal standards, redundant energy corridors, AI- and space-based early warning systems, and closer cooperation among NATO, EU, and regional platforms.
Ipek noted that despite the 1988 SUA Convention (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation) and its 2005 protocol, recent UN Security Council debates reaffirmed that “the current Law of the Sea is insufficient for protecting subsea energy assets against hybrid threats.”
Shared message: Cooperation is no longer optional
Across all sessions, speakers stressed that the Baltic and Black Seas are now central to Europe’s energy security – and equally central as zones of vulnerability.
Hybrid threats, contested waters, and energy-transition pressures converge to challenge both regional and transcontinental stability.
As Lang said, the discussions should “spark new ideas and contribute to valuable recommendations” as Türkiye, Poland, and their European partners confront the next phase of maritime security challenges stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
