- Both analysts say US policy in Africa is shifting from aid and diplomacy toward a more transactional approach, with commercial deals replacing long-term development support
ISTANBUL
The US-brokered deal signed in Washington on Friday between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda brought a glimpse of hope to a region ravaged by one of Africa’s worst crises in years, after a fresh offensive by the M23 rebel group and its allies escalated fighting in the east, killing thousands and forcing millions from their homes.
Since December 2024, M23 fighters have seized control of Goma and Bukavu – the provincial capitals of North and South Kivu – deepening instability in a region long haunted by armed groups and contested mineral wealth. The group, one of hundreds active in eastern Congo, claims to defend the rights of the ethnic Tutsi minority.
The violence has left more than 7,000 people dead this year, according to Prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka, while the UN says the number of displaced people has climbed to over 7.8 million.
A push for peace gathered momentum in March, when Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame agreed to a ceasefire in Doha, brokered by the emir of Qatar. Three months later, both sides signed a peace agreement in Washington that includes commitments to respect territorial integrity, cease hostilities, disengage and disarm non-state armed groups, establish a joint security coordination mechanism, and facilitate the return of refugees, humanitarian access, and regional economic cooperation.
But analysts say any mineral pact is unlikely to bring lasting peace without addressing the underlying socioeconomic and political issues.
Rose Mumanya, a political risk analyst based in Kenya, pointed to the ongoing marginalization of Congo’s Tutsi community, the alleged meddling of neighboring Rwanda, and the M23’s suspected ties to Kigali.
Still, she told Anadolu that the deal’s main function would be to “increase the incentive for the US to get involved in the conflict as a mediator.”
Daniel Van Dalen, a senior analyst at Signal Risk, was even more skeptical. “I think the deal in itself won’t have any direct impact on the security environment,” he said. If anything, he argued, it would boost the Congolese military through weapons sales, training, and logistics – without addressing deeper governance problems in the region.
He warned that progress might suffer due to the activities of political actors with covert agreements with rebel groups, adding that even if the Congolese military improves, this would not necessarily bring stability to the country’s east “on its own.”
Rwanda’s role
Rwanda’s role looms large over any resolution to the conflict, with Kinshasa, the UN, and Western governments repeatedly accusing Kigali of backing M23. Rwanda denies the claims and counters that Congo’s army cooperates with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a group whose members are implicated in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.
Van Dalen said the US is “playing both sides,” highlighting Washington’s interest in a Rwanda asylum agreement similar to the UK’s failed deal.
In 2022, Rwanda signed a controversial deal with the UK’s then-Conservative government to host irregular migrants. The arrangement collapsed after the Labour Party scrapped it, prompting Rwanda to demand over £50 million ($67.7 million) in compensation.
Referring to mediated talks between Congo and M23 that fell through earlier this year, Van Dalen said Kigali had refused to participate in the Angola-led Luanda peace process.
The US may also use the agreement to push Rwanda to increase transparency in its mineral sourcing, Mumanya said, especially since much of Rwanda’s supply comes from eastern Congo. “A lot of it is done legally,” she noted, “but there’s also accusations of illegal sources.”
By pressuring Kigali to reduce transactions with armed groups, Washington aims to weaken the rebels’ grip on mining revenues. That might also deter interference in major mining projects led by US companies — though Mumanya cautioned that state weakness in the east means full Congolese control over its minerals remains unlikely.
Minerals, geopolitics, and China’s shadow
The US effort to mediate between Congo and Rwanda and enter strategic partnerships reflects a broader pivot in American policy, as Washington seeks to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s mineral sector.
Congo, home to vast reserves of crucial minerals like cobalt, copper, tantalum, and gold, is eager to attract Western investment after years of underdevelopment and foreign exploitation.
Van Dalen pointed to a shift for African countries “taking better agency over their resources,” he said. Congo, he added, is “very cognizant of that.”
But Mumanya noted that while the US may not exploit Congo’s resources directly, its approach often sustains a familiar dynamic. Africa is still “seen as a place to extract resources, and then go and add value somewhere else,” she said.
However, US companies are likely to face resistance entering markets where China has established a firm foothold, as Beijing remains the heavyweight in Congo’s mining industry.
Van Dalen explained that Congo’s pursuit of arms and investment has given the US a “footprint” in the country’s critical minerals sector, where China “has dominated for years.”
However, he argued that Washington “will never ever step in” to fill the role China has played in offering large-scale infrastructure or port financing.
Van Dalen noted that past US administrations actively worked to curb China’s role in Congo — an effort that yielded results “to an extent,” with the country now “very pro-American, very pro-West.”
Still, he stressed the limits of transactional diplomacy. Soft-power diplomacy is no longer in play, he said, with the relationship now focused solely on the “commercial aspect.”
Under President Trump, US policy in Africa may grow even more deal-oriented, Van Dalen said.
Mumanya agreed that the US is moving toward a more transactional relationship with Africa, especially under Trump. But she cautioned that aid remains an “important tool” for Washington’s influence on the continent and will not disappear entirely.
While American firms have historically been reluctant to enter unstable or corrupt environments like eastern Congo, she said that could shift. “Chinese companies tend to have a bigger risk appetite,” she noted, but under Trump, there might be “greater incentive to upset China’s control.”
